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Case: 17-2683     Document: 003113093603     Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/26/2018
2 
 
 
Matthew J. Archambeault [Argued] 
Law Office of Michael J. Archambeault 
1420 Walnut Street 
Suite 1188 
Philadelphia, PA 19102 
  Counsel for Petitioner 
 
Brianne W. Cohen 
Lindsay Dunn [Argued] 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC 20044 
  Counsel for Respondent 
______________ 
 
OPINION  
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Victor Manuel Frutis Salmoran seeks review of the 
determination of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA” or 
“the Board”) that he committed both an aggravated felony and 
a crime of child abuse pursuant to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”), see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(I), 
1227(a)(2)(E)(i) (2012).  For the reasons below, we hold that a 
conviction under section 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) of the New Jersey 
Statutes Annotated for possession of child pornography 
qualifies as a crime of child abuse, but does not qualify as an 
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aggravated felony relating to child pornography.1  
Accordingly, while Salmoran is removable, he may still file an 
application for cancellation of removal.  We will therefore 
grant the petition for review in part, deny it in part, and remand 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I. Background 
 Salmoran is a native and citizen of Mexico who was 
granted lawful permanent resident status in 2004.  In 2015, he 
pled guilty to a September 2012 violation of section 2C:24-
4(b)(5)(b).2  The statute provides that: 
Any person who knowingly possesses or 
knowingly views any photograph, film, 
videotape, computer program or file, video game 
                                                 
 1 Because Salmoran’s offense occurred in September 
2012, the version of section 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) at issue in this 
case is that which was in effect from December 28, 2001 to 
June 30, 2013. 
 2   Whether Salmoran has any other criminal arrests or 
convictions is irrelevant to the legal questions before us 
because the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
only charged him as removable in relation to the 2012 
possession of child pornography offense.  See Pet’r’s Br. 4; 
Resp’t’s Br. 3 & n.2.  Compare A.R. 112 (“The defendant has 
no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity . . . .”), with 
A.R. 118 (identifying arrests and a conviction relating to 
prostitution). 
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or any other reproduction or reconstruction 
which depicts a child engaging in a prohibited 
sexual act or in the simulation of such an act, 
including on the Internet, is guilty of a crime of 
the fourth degree. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) (amended 2013 and 2017).3 
 In 2016, DHS initiated removal proceedings charging 
Salmoran as removable for having been convicted of:  (1) the 
aggravated felony crime of sexual abuse of a minor; (2) an 
offense relating to child pornography; and (3) a crime of child 
abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.4  The Immigration 
Judge (“IJ”) concluded that the possession of child 
pornography offense was not categorically an aggravated 
felony for sexual abuse of a minor, but was categorically an 
                                                 
 3 A child for the purposes of the statute is “any person 
under 16 years of age.”  Id. § 2C:24-4(b)(1). 
 4 The INA includes as a class of deportable aliens “[a]ny 
alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after 
admission.”  8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).  The statute defines 
“aggravated felony” by reference to a list of offenses.  Id. 
§ 1101(a)(43).  The INA also includes as a class of deportable 
aliens “[a]ny alien who at any time after admission is convicted 
of a crime of domestic violence, a crime of stalking, or a crime 
of child abuse, child neglect, or child abandonment.”  Id. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(E)(i).  While a conviction for either a crime of 
child abuse or aggravated felony renders a lawful permanent 
resident removable, only an aggravated felony conviction 
makes an individual ineligible for cancellation of removal.  See 
id. § 1229b(a)(3), (b)(1)(C). 
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aggravated felony for child pornography and a crime of child 
abuse.   
 Salmoran appealed the IJ’s decision and order removing 
him to Mexico.  On de novo review, the Board agreed that a 
conviction under section 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) “categorically 
constitutes a crime of child abuse, so as to subject him to 
removal on that basis.”  It therefore did not address whether the 
state conviction was categorically an aggravated felony for an 
offense relating to child pornography.   
 In his motion to reconsider, Salmoran requested that the 
BIA also determine his removability for having been convicted 
of an aggravated felony relating to child pornography because, 
but for the aggravated felony bar, he would be eligible for 
cancellation of removal.  The BIA granted his request but 
ultimately rejected his argument that the state statute was 
broader than the federal offense.  The Board consequently 
found that Salmoran was “statutorily precluded from applying 
for cancellation of removal under section 240A(a)(3) of the 
[INA]” and dismissed his appeal.  This timely petition 
followed.5  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The BIA had jurisdiction pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §§ 
1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, and it exercised jurisdiction over the 
                                                 
 5   Salmoran has already been removed to Mexico.  See 
Pet’r’s Br. 8; Resp’t’s Br. 8 n.5.  “[A]n alien’s removal from 
the United States,” however, “does not divest a federal court of 
appeals from considering the claims raised in a petition for 
review.”  Bejar v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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motion to reconsider under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b).  We have 
appellate jurisdiction over final orders of removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).6 
 “Where, as here, the BIA issues a written decision on 
the merits, we review its decision and not the decision of the 
IJ.”  Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(quoting Bautista v. Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 54, 57 (3d Cir. 2014)).  
“[W]e review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, subject 
to Chevron principles of deference.”  Denis v. Att’y Gen., 633 
F.3d 201, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2011). 
III. Discussion 
 The questions of whether the New Jersey child 
pornography conviction constitutes an aggravated felony or a 
crime of child abuse both require the application of the 
categorical approach.7  See, e.g., Mondragon-Gonzalez v. Att’y 
                                                 
 6   Section 1252(a)(2)(C) strips courts of jurisdiction “to 
review an order to remove an alien who commits an aggravated 
felony,” but we nonetheless retain jurisdiction “to hear 
‘constitutional claims and questions of law presented in 
petitions for review of final removal orders,’ even for those 
aliens convicted of an aggravated felony.”  Restrepo v. Att’y 
Gen., 617 F.3d 787, 790 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Papageorgiou 
v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 356, 358 (3d Cir. 2005)); see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(2)(C), (D). 
 7   There are departures to our presumptive application 
of the categorical approach, but none applies here.  First, there 
is no dispute as to the indivisibility of the statute of conviction 
so as to warrant the use of the modified categorical approach.  
See Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261-62 (2013) 
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Gen., 884 F.3d 155, 159-60 (3d Cir. 2018) (applying the 
categorical approach in a crime of child abuse case); Singh v. 
Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2016) (applying the 
categorical approach in an aggravated felony case).  Under the 
categorical approach, “we look ‘not to the facts of the 
particular prior case,’ but instead to whether ‘the state statute 
defining the crime of conviction’ categorically fits within the 
‘generic’ federal” offense.  Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 
190 (2013) (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 
183, 186 (2007)).  Only where “a conviction of the state 
offense ‘“necessarily” involved . . . facts equating to [the] 
generic [federal offense]’” is there a categorical match.  Id. 
(quoting Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24 (2005)).  
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, has 
cautioned that this approach “is not an invitation to apply ‘legal 
imagination’ to the state offense; [rather] there must be ‘a 
realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State 
would apply its statute to conduct that falls outside the generic 
definition of a crime.’”  Id. at 191 (quoting Gonzales v. 
Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193 (2007)). 
  
                                                 
(describing a divisible statute as one that “comprises multiple, 
alternative versions of the crime”).  Second, the terms of 
section 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) do not “invite inquiry into the facts 
underlying the conviction at issue.”  Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 
F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 2004) (including as examples where the 
statute includes a qualifier like “in which the loss to the victim 
or victims exceeds $10,000” or specifies crimes “committed 
within the last two years”).   
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A. Aggravated Felony 
 1. Facial Overbreadth 
 As a threshold matter, in considering Salmoran’s claim 
that the BIA erred in its aggravated felony determination, we 
note that Chevron deference is not implicated in our analysis.  
Under our precedent, Chevron deference is limited to the 
BIA’s reasonable interpretations of the INA and does not 
extend to its categorical approach determinations.  Singh v. 
Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d 503, 508 (3d Cir. 2012).  We have in some 
cases noted the “confusion surrounding the proper standard of 
review” with respect to “the role of Chevron deference in cases 
interpreting the [INA] generally, and the aggravated felony 
statute of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) in particular.”  Singh v. 
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d at 150 (quoting Patel v. Ashcroft, 294 F.3d 
465, 467 (3d Cir. 2002)).  Indeed, there may be some open 
questions concerning Chevron deference to the BIA’s 
interpretation of ambiguous terms as used in section 
1101(a)(43).  See id. at 151–52 (“[W]e . . . expressly reserve 
decision on whether some BIA interpretations of § 1101(a)(43) 
are entitled to deference.”). 
 Any such concerns about deference generally, however, 
are not present in this case.  Section 1101(a)(43)(I) 
incorporates by reference sections of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, 
and the BIA’s interpretations of federal criminal provisions 
outside the INA are not entitled to deference.  See Francis v. 
Reno, 269 F.3d 162, 168 (3d Cir. 2001); accord Singh v. 
Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 538 (3d Cir. 2006).  Even if there were 
a question as to the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252 in this 
case, then, it would not be “necessary [or] appropriate to defer 
to the BIA’s or IJ’s interpretation.”  Singh v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 
at 151.  Moreover, “we owe no deference to the BIA’s 
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interpretation of a state criminal statute,” which does not entail 
the BIA’s special expertise and which the INA does not even 
incorporate by reference.  Javier v. Att’y Gen., 826 F.3d 127, 
130 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 We therefore start on a blank slate in comparing the 
state statute of conviction and the federal offense.  Salmoran’s 
argument hinges in particular on the state statute’s definition 
of “prohibited sexual act” as:  sexual intercourse, anal 
intercourse, masturbation, bestiality, sadism, masochism, 
fellatio, cunnilingus, “[n]udity, if depicted for the purpose of 
sexual stimulation or gratification of any person who may view 
such depiction,” or “[a]ny act of sexual penetration or sexual 
contact as defined in N.J.S.2C:14-1.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-
4(b)(1).  Sexual contact, in turn, is defined as: 
an intentional touching by the victim or actor, 
either directly or through clothing, of the 
victim’s or actor’s intimate parts for the purpose 
of degrading or humiliating the victim or 
sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the 
actor.  Sexual contact of the actor with himself 
must be in view of the victim whom the actor 
knows to be present . . . .   
Id. § 2C:14-1(d).  Intimate parts are “sexual organs, genital 
area, anal area, inner thigh, groin, buttock or breast of a 
person.”  Id. § 2C:14-1(e).   
 The federal analog to Salmoran’s fourth-degree 
possession of child pornography conviction is found in 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), a violation of which the INA lists as 
an aggravated felony.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(I) (stating 
that “an offense described in section 2251, 2251A, or 2252 of 
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Title 18 (relating to child pornography)” is an aggravated 
felony).  Section 2252 in relevant part renders it a punishable 
offense to:  
knowingly possess[], or knowingly access[] with 
intent to view, 1 or more books, magazines, 
periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter 
which contain any visual depiction that has been 
mailed, or has been shipped or transported using 
any means or facility of interstate or foreign 
commerce or in or affecting interstate or foreign 
commerce, or which was produced using 
materials which have been mailed or so shipped 
or transported, by any means including by 
computer, if— 
(i) the producing of such visual depiction 
involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually 
explicit conduct; and 
(ii) such visual depiction is of such conduct . . . . 
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).8, 9  Sexually explicit conduct means 
actual or simulated “sexual intercourse, including genital-
                                                 
 8   A minor is “any person under the age of eighteen 
years.”  Id. § 2256(1). 
 9   As the IJ recognized, the federal offense’s inclusion 
of interstate or foreign commerce element is of no moment for 
purposes of our analysis.  See Torres v. Lynch, 136 S. Ct. 1619, 
1623 (2016) (holding that a state crime qualifies as an 
aggravated felony under the INA if it “corresponds to a 
specified federal offense in all ways but one—namely, the state 
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genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal”; bestiality; 
masturbation; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or “lascivious 
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person.”  Id. 
§ 2256(2)(A).   
 The BIA determined that “there is no meaningful 
distinction between the statutory definitions” of “prohibited 
sexual act” used in the state statute and “sexually explicit 
conduct” used in the federal statute.  We disagree and conclude 
that the plain language of section 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) 
encompasses a broader range of conduct than its federal 
counterpart. 
 First, among the conduct that the state statute 
criminalizes, by means of its definition of “sexual contact,” is 
the knowing possession of a visual depiction of an intentional 
touching, “either directly or through clothing,” of the inner 
thigh, breasts, or buttocks by either the minor victim or adult 
actor “for the purpose of degrading or humiliating the victim 
or sexually arousing or sexually gratifying the actor.”  N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:14-1(d).  By contrast, in terms of conduct other 
than sexual acts and sadistic or masochist abuse, the federal 
offense prohibits the “lascivious exhibition” of only the 
“genitals or pubic area of any person.”10  18 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
crime lacks the interstate commerce element used in the federal 
statute to establish legislative jurisdiction”). 
 10   We have explained that: 
[A]s used in the child pornography statute, the 
ordinary meaning of the phrase “lascivious 
exhibition” means a depiction which displays or 
brings forth to view in order to attract notice to 
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2256(2)(A).  Because the statute of conviction would then, for 
example, criminalize possession of a video depicting an adult 
actor intentionally touching the breasts of a minor victim for 
the purpose of sexually gratifying the actor, it does not 
categorically fall within the federal child pornography 
definition.  Cf. United States v. Gleich, 397 F.3d 608, 614 (8th 
Cir. 2005) (concluding that “taking pictures of a non-pubic 
area such as the buttocks does not meet the definition of 
‘sexually explicit conduct,’” as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
2256(2)(A)). 
 Second, Salmoran asserts that section 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) 
is categorically over inclusive for another reason:  the state 
statutory provision criminalizes “[n]udity, if depicted for the 
                                                 
the genitals or pubic area of children, in order to 
excite lustfulness or sexual stimulation in the 
viewer. Such a definition does not contain any 
requirement of nudity . . . . Nor does such a 
definition contain or suggest a requirement that 
the contours of the genitals or pubic area be 
discernible or otherwise visible through the child 
subject’s clothing.  
United States v. Knox, 32 F.3d 733, 745–46 (3d Cir. 1994).  
“‘[L]asciviousness is not a characteristic of the child 
photographed but of the exhibition which the photographer sets 
up for an audience that consists of himself or like minded 
pedophiles.’ . . . [T]he focus must be on the intended effect, 
rather [than] the actual effect, on the viewer.”  United States v. 
Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) (alteration added) 
(quoting United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th 
Cir. 1987)).   
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purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification of any person 
who may view such depiction,” even if there is no 
accompanying depiction of a sexual act or exhibition of the 
genitals or pubic area.  The BIA rejected this argument in part 
by stating: 
New Jersey’s definition appears to be more 
specific than the federal definition, 
differentiating exhibition of the genitalia and 
nudity, and requiring more than simple nudity 
but rather nudity depicted for the purpose of 
sexual stimulation or gratification. . . . [T]he 
Third Circuit . . . held in United States v. Knox, 
32 F.3d 733 (3d Cir. 1994), that the inclusion of 
“lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic 
area of any person” in the federal definition is 
broader than a similar Pennsylvania definition 
which requires actual nudity.  “Notably, nudity 
alone is not enough for ‘lasciviousness,’ since, as 
the Third Circuit noted, the phrase ‘exhibition of 
the genitals or pubic area’ in § 2256(2) is 
qualified by the term ‘lascivious.’” 
App. 7 (citation omitted) (quoting Doe v. Chamberlin, 139 F. 
Supp. 2d 637, 641 (M.D. Pa. 2001)).   
 The BIA’s reasoning is flawed.  Most importantly, the 
analysis fails to account for the express emphasis on “genitals 
or pubic area” contained in the federal definition.  The state 
statute, meanwhile, applies to any nudity—and not necessarily 
that which shows genitals or the pubic area—depicted for the 
purpose of sexual stimulation or gratification.  Furthermore, 
the statute of conviction’s purpose element does not undercut 
Salmoran’s contention that there are depictions criminalized by 
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the New Jersey statute that would not fall within the ambit of 
§ 2252.  Despite the BIA’s statement, it need not be true that 
“images that depict nudity for the purpose of sexual stimulation 
or gratification under New Jersey law would necessarily depict 
lascivious exhibition of the genitals under the definition [at] 18 
U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A)(v).”  Id. (emphasis added).   
 The Government argues unpersuasively that the 
analysis this Court employs to determine whether there is 
“lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any 
person,” see United States v. Villard, 885 F.2d 117, 122 (3d 
Cir. 1989), means that depictions that contain other “hallmarks 
of lascivious conduct” may be criminalized even in the absence 
of a focus on the genitals or pubic area.11  Resp’t’s Br. 30 
                                                 
 11   In Villard, we adopted the so-called Dost factors 
(taken from United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828 (S.D. Cal. 
1986)) “as a means of determining whether a genital exhibition 
is ‘lascivious.’”  885 F.2d at 122.  These factors are: 
1) whether the focal point of the visual depiction 
is on the child’s genitalia or pubic area; 
2) whether the setting of the visual depiction is 
sexually suggestive, i.e., in a place or pose 
generally associated with sexual activity; 
3) whether the child is depicted in an unnatural 
pose, or in inappropriate attire, considering the 
age of the child; 
4) whether the child is fully or partially clothed, 
or nude; 
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(quoting United States v. Larkin, 629 F.3d 177, 182 (3d Cir. 
2010)).  We did in United States v. Larkin conclude that two 
photographs that did not satisfy the first Dost factor of focusing 
on the minor’s genitalia were nonetheless lascivious.  629 F.3d 
177, 182-85 (3d Cir. 2010).  There is a distinction, however, 
between depictions where the focus is not on the genitals or 
pubic area and those that do not at all feature those regions—
and in the photographs in Larkin, the minor is “completely 
nude.”  Id. at 183, 185; see id. at 184 (“Nothing but B.L.’s 
entire nude body, with an emphasis on her breasts, is depicted 
in this photograph.  Although the genitals are visible because 
the child is naked, factor one is not present because the focus 
is not on the genitalia.”).  Indeed, we expressly held in Knox 
that “the question whether the depiction at issue visually 
exhibits the genitals or pubic area is a threshold determination 
not necessarily guided by the Dost factors.”  32 F.3d at 751; 
see also United States v. McGrattan, 504 F.3d 608, 613–14 
(6th Cir. 2007) (considering a state statute that prohibited “all 
lewd exhibitions of nudity involving minors” and 
acknowledging that its application to “someone who possessed 
depictions of nudity which were lewd, but which did not 
involve the genitals” would be overbroad).  We therefore agree 
                                                 
5) whether the visual depiction suggests sexual 
coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual 
activity; 
6) whether the visual depiction is intended or 
designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. 
Id.  “[N]o single factor should be given undue weight and . . . 
a depiction need not involve all the factors in order to be 
‘lascivious.’”  Id. 
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with Salmoran that the BIA’s analysis as to overbreadth was 
erroneous. 
2. Realistic Probability  
 Although we have determined that the language of 
section 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) plainly encompasses a broader range 
of conduct than the federal offense, the Government contends 
that Salmoran must still identify “a decision demonstrating that 
the State applies N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) to images 
beyond those contemplated by its federal counterpart.”  
Resp’t’s Suppl. Br. 3.  Admittedly, this argument is not wholly 
baseless and finds some support in the language of Duenas-
Alvarez that “[t]o show . . . realistic probability, an offender . . 
. must at least point to his own case or other cases in which the 
state courts in fact did apply the statute in the special 
(nongeneric) manner for which he argues.”  549 U.S. 183, 193 
(2007); see also Moncrieffe, 569 U.S. at 205–06 (stating that if 
comparing “§ 1101(a)(43)(C), which refers to a federal 
firearms statute that contains an exception for ‘antique 
firearm[s],’” with a “state firearms law that lacks such an 
exception,” “a noncitizen would have to demonstrate that the 
State actually prosecutes the relevant offense in cases 
involving antique firearms” to “defeat the categorical 
comparison in this manner”).   
 Indeed, we recognize that said language has caused 
some confusion in the courts of appeals.  For example, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, like the 
BIA, requires proof of actual prosecution even where the crime 
of conviction contains broader language.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Castillo-Rivera, 853 F.3d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 2017) 
(“There is no exception to the actual case requirement 
articulated in Duenas-Alvarez where a court concludes a state 
Case: 17-2683     Document: 003113093603     Page: 16      Date Filed: 11/26/2018
17 
 
statute is broader on its face.  Indeed, the Court in Duenas-
Alvarez emphasized that a defendant must ‘at least’ point to an 
actual state case . . . .” (quoting Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 
193)); see also Matter of Ferreira, 26 I. & N. Dec. 415, 420–
21 (B.I.A. 2014) (“[T]he import of Moncrieffe and Duenas-
Alvarez is that even where a State statute on its face covers a 
type of object or substance not included in a Federal statute’s 
generic definition, there must be a realistic probability that the 
State would prosecute conduct falling outside the generic 
crime in order to defeat a charge of removability.”). 
 Our Court’s precedent, however, takes the alternative 
approach.  In Singh v. Attorney General, we highlighted that 
the relevant elements of the statutes at issue in Moncrieffe and 
Duenas-Alvarez were identical.12  839 F.3d at 286 n.10.  But 
                                                 
 12   In Moncrieffe, the Court compared a Georgia crime 
of conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to 
distribute to a federal drug trafficking crime.  569 U.S. at 188–
89.  The petitioner there argued that the state statute, which 
“punishe[d] all marijuana distribution without regard to the 
amount or remuneration,” was not categorically an aggravated 
felony because it proscribed conduct described by both 18 
U.S.C. § 841’s felony and misdemeanor provisions.  Id. at 189–
90.   
 In Duenas-Alvarez, the petitioner was convicted of 
violating a California statutory provision that criminalizes the 
conduct of any person who drives or takes another’s vehicle 
(without consent and with intent to deprive the owner of title 
or possession) “or any person who is a party or an accessory to 
or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or 
stealing.”  549 U.S. at 187 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Cal. 
Veh. Code Ann. § 10851(a) (West 2000)).  He argued that 
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where “the elements of the crime of conviction are not the same 
as the elements of the generic federal offense,” we explained, 
we believe “the ‘realistic probability’ language” (or, the 
“‘realistic probability’ inquiry”) of Moncrieffe is “simply not 
meant to apply.”  Id.; see id. at 286 (holding that the BIA “erred 
in conducting a ‘realistic probability’ inquiry” in ascertaining 
whether a Pennsylvania drug conviction was an aggravated 
felony); see also Swaby v. Yates, 847 F.3d 62, 66 (1st Cir. 
2017) (“The state crime at issue clearly does apply more 
broadly than the federally defined offense.  Nothing in 
Duenas–Alvarez, therefore, indicates that this state law crime 
may be treated as if it is narrower than it plainly is.”); Ramos 
v. Att’y Gen., 709 F.3d 1066, 1071–72 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that Duenas-Alvarez does not control where the 
statute’s language itself “creates the ‘realistic probability’ that 
a state would apply the statute to conduct beyond the generic 
definition”); United States v. Grisel, 488 F.3d 844, 850 (9th 
Cir. 2007) (“Where, as here, a state statute explicitly defines a 
crime more broadly than the generic definition, no ‘legal 
imagination’ is required to hold that a realistic probability 
exists that the state will apply its statute to conduct that falls 
outside the generic definition of the crime.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. at 193)). 
 Singh v. Attorney General, therefore, forecloses the 
Government’s contention and prevents placing an undue 
                                                 
California caselaw “makes a defendant criminally liable for 
conduct that the defendant did not intend, not even as a known 
or almost certain byproduct of the defendant’s intentional 
acts,” and application of the state statute therefore “creates a 
subspecies of the Vehicle Code section crime that falls outside 
the generic definition of ‘theft.’”  Id. at 191, 194.   
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burden on petitioners of identifying cases of actual prosecution 
where the statute expressly authorizes the state government to 
enforce broader conduct.13  In these situations, it is a matter of 
semantics as to whether we state that the realistic probability 
inquiry is not meant to apply, see Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 
at 286 n.10, or the realistic probability requirement is 
necessarily satisfied because “legal imagination” is not needed, 
                                                 
 13   Despite the Government’s argument to the contrary, 
Singh’s application of the modified categorical approach and 
the controlled substance schedule context do not provide bases 
to distinguish when proof of actual prosecution is required for 
the realistic probability inquiry.  See Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 
F.3d at 279 n.2 (“The modified categorical approach is not 
distinct from the categorical approach, but rather a ‘tool for 
implementing the categorical approach.’” (quoting Descamps, 
570 U.S. at 262)).   
 Moreover, our opinion in Lewin v. Attorney General, 
885 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 2018), is consistent with the reasoning 
in Singh.  In Lewin, we rejected the petitioner’s argument that 
his New Jersey conviction for receipt of stolen property was 
broader than the generic federal offense of receiving stolen 
property.  Id. at 170.  The petitioner challenged “the sufficiency 
of the mens rea element of [the state] offense,” id. at 167, but 
the statute of conviction “refer[red] to a specific defendant’s 
knowledge or belief,” which aligned with the intent element of 
the generic federal offense, see id. at 169-70.  The elements of 
the statute of conviction and the generic offense were thus the 
same; our note that “[a]t most, [the petitioner] raise[d] a 
theoretical” claim that does not satisfy the Moncrieffe realistic 
probability requirement was appropriate in that context.  Id. at 
170. 
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see Grisel, 488 F.3d at 850.  Here, because section 2C:24-
4(b)(5)(b) plainly encompasses more conduct than its federal 
counterpart, Salmoran does not need to identify cases in which 
New Jersey actually prosecuted overbroad conduct.  The 
statute of conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony.   
B. Crime of Child Abuse 
 Having concluded that section 2C:24-4(b)(5)(b) does 
not qualify as an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(43)(I), we next consider whether Salmoran is 
nevertheless removable because the conviction constituted a 
crime of child abuse.   
 The INA does not define “crime of child abuse,” nor is 
the phrase’s meaning as used in the statute “plain and 
unambiguous”; as a result, under Chevron, we must defer to 
the BIA’s interpretation of the phrase if it is “based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”  Mondragon-
Gonzalez, 884 F.3d at 158 (quoting Florez v. Holder, 779 F.3d 
207, 211 (2d Cir. 2015)).  We recently addressed that precise 
issue in Mondragon-Gonzalez, in which we held that the BIA’s 
broad interpretation of a crime of child abuse is reasonable and 
is owed deference.14  Id. at 158–59.  The agency defines “crime 
of child abuse” as: 
any offense involving an intentional, knowing, 
reckless, or criminally negligent act or omission 
                                                 
 14   While we defer to the Board’s interpretation of 
“crime of child abuse,” we owe no deference to—and review 
de novo—its categorical approach determination.  See Singh v. 
Att’y Gen., 677 F.3d at 508. 
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that constitutes maltreatment of a child or that 
impairs a child’s physical or mental well-being, 
including sexual abuse or exploitation. At a 
minimum, this definition encompasses 
convictions for offenses involving the infliction 
on a child of physical harm, even if slight; mental 
or emotional harm, including acts injurious to 
morals; sexual abuse, including direct acts of 
sexual contact, but also including acts that 
induce (or omissions that permit) a child to 
engage in prostitution, pornography, or other 
sexually explicit conduct; as well as any act that 
involves the use or exploitation of a child as an 
object of sexual gratification . . . . 
Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & N. Dec. 503, 512 (B.I.A. 
2008); see also Matter of Soram, 25 I. & N. Dec. 378, 381 
(B.I.A. 2010) (holding that “proof of actual harm or injury to 
the child” is not required).   
 The conviction at issue here categorically matches the 
part of the BIA’s definition of child abuse that includes “any 
act that involves the use or exploitation of a child as an object 
of sexual gratification.”  Matter of Velazquez-Herrera, 24 I. & 
N. Dec. at 512.  Although Salmoran argues that possession of 
child pornography does not entail exploitation of the child, this 
position is untenable.  As the Supreme Court has noted, “[t]he 
harms caused by child pornography . . . are . . . extensive 
because child pornography is ‘a permanent record’ of the 
depicted child’s abuse, and ‘the harm to the child is 
exacerbated by [its] circulation.’”  Paroline v. United States, 
572 U.S. 434, 440 (2014) (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 
U.S. 747, 759 (1982)); cf. Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 111 
(1990) (noting that the existence of the pornography “haunt[s] 
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the children in years to come”).  Possession of child 
pornography thus perpetuates the abuse of that child and 
amounts to “use or exploitation” because of the content, 
purpose, and effect of possessing the images.  Salmoran’s state 
offense therefore falls squarely within the BIA’s definition of 
the generic offense. 
IV. Conclusion 
 While Salmoran is removable for having committed a 
crime of child abuse,15 he may nevertheless file an application 
for cancellation of removal because his state child pornography 
conviction does not constitute an aggravated felony.  We will 
accordingly grant the petition for review in part, deny it in part, 
and remand for further proceedings to allow Salmoran the 
opportunity to apply for cancellation of removal.   
                                                 
 15   We consequently decline Salmoran’s request to 
order DHS to facilitate his return to the United States.   
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